Scientific articles

Moral injury is a specific kind of trauma caused by violations of deeply internalised moral values. It has been particularly studied in the United States from the ’90s of the last century among Vietnam veterans, but it may appear in a variety of contexts, from healthcare to educational and organisational ones. In the latest text revision of the DSM-5 it is not recognised as a distinct disorder; however, it should be distinguished from the classic post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as a careful analysis of its nosology and aetiology reveals different characteristics. Although PTSD and moral injury can coexist, the specific symptoms of the latter do not focus on terror linked to violence and death, but on emotions and moral cognitions, such as shame, anguish, attributions of guilt, and loss of existential meaning, which are associated with dysfunctional internalising and externalising behaviours, according to the cases. Such a collapse of the integrity of the individual’s moral identity cannot be addressed through the traditional tools used in the treatment of PTSD, which focus on the extinction of fear and avoidance reactions, and the habituation to memories related to traumatic events through physiological relaxation. Rather, moral injury can be soothed thanks to a reconstruction of meaning that reinstates the moral character of the person and restores a solid link between I and Self, leveraging recovery of trust in others, conscious self-observation, compassionate acceptance, forgiveness and reconciliation, and development of a renewed life project. Psychosynthesis is well suited to provide tools aimed at this kind of transformation, in that it promotes a syncretic approach to the bio-psycho-spiritual dimensions of the human being. Offering wide recognition of ethical and transpersonal instances, Psychosynthesis promises the possibility of rejoining the components of the personality fragmented by the moral injury, facilitating motion toward a possible and personalised “ideal model” capable of integrating the moral values that support the fullest actualisation of the individual’s authentic Self.

I present a new model of the self-regulation of virtue that integrates perspectives on emotion, cognition, and motivation. Across three vignette-based studies in US/UK (N=1,540), I developed through exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis a multi-item measure of broadening and defensive responses, the Self-Regulation of Virtue Inventory (SRVI). I applied that measurement model to two new scenarios portraying prototypical moral exemplars (selected from a set of 12) and fitted structural models that identify key antecedents: motivational dispositions (regulatory focus and hedonic orientation) and moral comparisons (opinion and ability-based). The findings were consistent with network analysis, providing initial evidence of their robustness. By integrating literatures on motivation, emotion, social cognition and comparison within a self-regulation framework, I provide initial evidence to advance theory on moral self-regulation and moral education, with practical implications on how to maximise the upsides of virtue while mitigating or channelling its possible drawbacks.

Bella, A. F. (2023). Psychological underpinnings of akrasia: a new integrative framework based on self-regulation vulnerabilities and failures. New Ideas in Psychology, 70, 101027. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2023.101027
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Free access preprints at the following links:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370510639_Psychological_Underpinnings_of_Akrasia_A_New_Integrative_Framework_Based_on_Self-Regulation_Vulnerabilities_and_Failures

https://www.academia.edu/101235613/Psychological_Underpinnings_of_Akrasia_A_New_Integrative_Framework_Based_on_Self_Regulation_Vulnerabilities_and_Failures

Akrasia is intentional behavior against one’s better judgment. This concept has a rich history in Western philosophy, but it does not feature prominently in the psychological literature. After a brief conceptual review, I propose here a new integrative theoretical framework that draws on motivation science to explicate its psychological underpinnings. Leveraging cybernetic big five and regulatory mode theories, I argue that the self-regulation processes underlying key personality structures can explain why regulatory vulnerabilities can lead to various kinds of akratic failures. For example, I elucidate how maladjusted extraversion associated with a chronic malfunctioning of the assessment and locomotion modes could lead to hedonic dysregulations typical of a specific form of akratic behavior characterized by excessive self-indulgence. This new framework marries multiple disciplines and recomposes the fragmentation of the philosophical speculation on akrasia, suggesting pathways towards potential psychological interventions to mitigate its maladaptive consequences.

Bella, A. F. (2022). The psychological motives of prevention and promotion focus behind the Kantian conception of practical ideas and ideals: commentary and extension to Englert’s (2022) ‘How a Kantian ideal can be practical’. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2022.2128866
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Free access preprints at the following links:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363944680_The_psychological_motives_of_prevention_and_promotion_focus_behind_the_Kantian_conception_of_practical_ideas_and_ideals_commentary_and_extension_to_Englert’s_2022_’How_a_Kantian_ideal_can_be_practical

https://www.academia.edu/89937386/The_psychological_motives_of_prevention_and_promotion_focus_behind_the_Kantian_conception_of_practical_ideas_and_ideals_commentary_and_extension_to_Englert_s_2022_How_a_Kantian_ideal_can_be_practical_

The present brief commentary to Englert’s recent article on Kant’s distinction between practical ideas and ideals extends the significance of its contribution by considering the psychological dimensions underpinned by those ethical concepts. According to regulatory focus theory, in the moral domain the prevention focus subsumes duties and obligations, whereas the promotion focus underlies aspirations toward virtue. I argue here that prevention motives induce the enactment of behaviours consistent with ethical rules corresponding to Kant’s practical idea, and that promotion motives inspire imitation processes aimed at advancement toward the archetypal excellence of Kant’s practical ideal. I conclude discussing the relevance and value, beyond Kant’s ethical conception, of a psychological analysis of the main Western normative theories through the lens of regulatory focus and the other motivational primitives.

Bella, A. F. (2022). Where psychological science meets moral theory: linking up motivational primitives with normative ethics. Theory and Psychology, 32 (4), 590-612. https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221100493
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Free access preprints at the following links:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360969275_Where_psychological_science_meets_moral_theory_Linking_up_motivational_primitives_with_normative_ethics

https://www.academia.edu/80362664/Where_psychological_science_meets_moral_theory_Linking_up_motivational_primitives_with_normative_ethics

The main normative moral theories in Western thought, from deontology to virtue and consequentialist ethics, revolve around conceptions of the moral right, good, and worth. However, a few elementary psychological motives lie at a deeper level. In the present article, I outline the key tenets of regulatory focus, regulatory mode, and the hedonic principle (approach/avoidance), which I define “motivational primitives”, and provide a conceptual analysis of their links with specific ethical systems. I unveil how moral judgment in each of them is psychologically construed on the basis of the motivational primitives and their underlying self-regulatory processes. The credibility of the proposed framework will be fully brought to life when researchers, having agreed on satisfactory operationalizations and manipulations of the primitives, will be able to reconcile the speculative and the empirical planes.

Cornwell, J. F. M., & Bella, A. F. (2022). Morals for the sake of movement: locomotion and sensitivity to norms in moral dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 101, 104322. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2022.104322
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Free access preprints at the following links:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/359442490_Morals_for_the_sake_of_movement_Locomotion_and_sensitivity_to_norms_in_moral_dilemmas

https://www.academia.edu/76693735/Morals_for_the_sake_of_movement_Locomotion_and_sensitivity_to_norms_in_moral_dilemmas

Recent research on moral dilemmas has delineated preferences for utilitarian vs. deontological judgments along three parameters: sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to norms, and general preferences for inaction (Gawronski et al., 2017; Körner et al., 2020). However, research has not yet determined whether motivational differences contribute to these three parameters in moral judgment. Across two studies, using regulatory mode theory, we demonstrate that a motivation to initiate and sustain smooth movement (locomotion), independent of a motive to engage in critical evaluation and reflection (assessment), is associated with greater sensitivity to norms in moral judgments. We demonstrate this association through both a chronic measure of individual differences (Study 1), and through a preregistered experimental induction (Study 2). Implications of our findings for moral judgment and motivation are discussed.