Articoli scientifici

The field of boredom studies has seen considerable advances in recent years. The present article fits into that line of research, focusing on boredom in the workplace and integrating various literatures in cognitive, social, health, and occupational psychology within a novel organising framework. After drawing up a streamlined nomological network, we propose a new self-regulatory conceptual model based on self-determination theory that parsimoniously fills a theoretical gap and lays the foundations for further empirical research. The critical components of the emotion of boredom, that is, meaninglessness and inadequate stimulation of attention, are posited to stem from unfavourable job-person appraisals. This mismatch is ascribable to states of amotivation brought about by the inability of the job characteristics (skillset, control, sociality) to satisfy workers’ basic psychological needs (competence, autonomy, relatedness) that conceptually mirror those job features. The model describes how, when boredom sets in, individuals and organisations can self-regulate their behaviour through various adaptive coping strategies in order to restore conditions of homeostatic balance. It also highlights dysfunctional strategies that in the long run turn out to be either ineffective or even harmful in terms of individuals’ well-being as well as organisational health and performance. We discuss the theoretical and practical significance of the new conceptual model as well as its limitations, and call for empirical research in the field.

La sindrome da ferita morale è un trauma causato da violazioni di valori morali profondamente interiorizzati. È stata studiata in particolare negli Stati Uniti a partire dagli anni ’90 del secolo scorso fra i veterani del Vietnam, ma può apparire in una pluralità di contesti, da quelli sanitari e socio-assistenziali a quelli educativi e organizzativi. Nell’ultima revisione del testo del DSM-5 non è riconosciuto come un disturbo a sé stante; tuttavia, dovrebbe essere distinto dal classico disturbo da stress post-traumatico (PTSD), poiché un’attenta analisi della sua nosologia ed eziologia rivela caratteristiche diverse. Benché PTSD e disturbi da ferita morale possano coesistere, i sintomi specifici di quest’ultima non vertono sul terrore legato a violenza e morte, bensì su emozioni e cognizioni morali, quali vergogna, angoscia, attribuzioni di colpa e perdita di significato esistenziale, che si associano a comportamenti disfunzionali interiorizzanti ed esteriorizzanti, secondo i casi. Un tale tracollo dell’integrità dell’identità morale non può essere affrontato con gli strumenti tradizionali del PTSD, che mirano all’estinzione delle reazioni di paura ed evitamento, e all’assuefazione ai ricordi legati agli eventi traumatici attraverso il rilassamento fisiologico. La ferita morale può essere lenita invece mediante una ricostruzione di senso che reintegri il carattere morale della persona e ripristini un più solido legame fra Io e Sé, facendo leva sul recupero della fiducia nel prossimo, l’osservazione consapevole di sé, l’accettazione compassionevole, il perdono e la riconciliazione, e la formulazione di un rinnovato progetto di vita. La Psicosintesi ben si presta ad offrire strumenti volti a questo tipo di trasformazione, in quanto promuove un approccio sincretico alle dimensioni bio-psico-spirituali dell’essere umano. Dando ampio riconoscimento alle istanze etiche e transpersonali, la Psicosintesi promette la possibilità di riunificare le componenti della personalità frammentate dal trauma morale, consentendo l’avvicinamento ad un “modello ideale” possibile e personalizzato, che dia spazio a quei valori morali che supportano una più piena realizzazione del Sé autentico dell’individuo.

I present a new model of the self-regulation of virtue that integrates perspectives on emotion, cognition, and motivation. Across three vignette-based studies in US/UK (N=1,540), I developed through exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis a multi-item measure of broadening and defensive responses, the Self-Regulation of Virtue Inventory (SRVI). I applied that measurement model to two new scenarios portraying prototypical moral exemplars (selected from a set of 12) and fitted structural models that identify key antecedents: motivational dispositions (regulatory focus and hedonic orientation) and moral comparisons (opinion and ability-based). The findings were consistent with network analysis, providing initial evidence of their robustness. By integrating literatures on motivation, emotion, social cognition and comparison within a self-regulation framework, I provide initial evidence to advance theory on moral self-regulation and moral education, with practical implications on how to maximise the upsides of virtue while mitigating or channelling its possible drawbacks.

Akrasia is intentional behavior against one’s better judgment. This concept has a rich history in Western philosophy, but it does not feature prominently in the psychological literature. After a brief conceptual review, I propose here a new integrative theoretical framework that draws on motivation science to explicate its psychological underpinnings. Leveraging cybernetic big five and regulatory mode theories, I argue that the self-regulation processes underlying key personality structures can explain why regulatory vulnerabilities can lead to various kinds of akratic failures. For example, I elucidate how maladjusted extraversion associated with a chronic malfunctioning of the assessment and locomotion modes could lead to hedonic dysregulations typical of a specific form of akratic behavior characterized by excessive self-indulgence. This new framework marries multiple disciplines and recomposes the fragmentation of the philosophical speculation on akrasia, suggesting pathways towards potential psychological interventions to mitigate its maladaptive consequences.

The present brief commentary to Englert’s recent article on Kant’s distinction between practical ideas and ideals extends the significance of its contribution by considering the psychological dimensions underpinned by those ethical concepts. According to regulatory focus theory, in the moral domain the prevention focus subsumes duties and obligations, whereas the promotion focus underlies aspirations toward virtue. I argue here that prevention motives induce the enactment of behaviours consistent with ethical rules corresponding to Kant’s practical idea, and that promotion motives inspire imitation processes aimed at advancement toward the archetypal excellence of Kant’s practical ideal. I conclude discussing the relevance and value, beyond Kant’s ethical conception, of a psychological analysis of the main Western normative theories through the lens of regulatory focus and the other motivational primitives.

The main normative moral theories in Western thought, from deontology to virtue and consequentialist ethics, revolve around conceptions of the moral right, good, and worth. However, a few elementary psychological motives lie at a deeper level. In the present article, I outline the key tenets of regulatory focus, regulatory mode, and the hedonic principle (approach/avoidance), which I define “motivational primitives”, and provide a conceptual analysis of their links with specific ethical systems. I unveil how moral judgment in each of them is psychologically construed on the basis of the motivational primitives and their underlying self-regulatory processes. The credibility of the proposed framework will be fully brought to life when researchers, having agreed on satisfactory operationalizations and manipulations of the primitives, will be able to reconcile the speculative and the empirical planes.

Recent research on moral dilemmas has delineated preferences for utilitarian vs. deontological judgments along three parameters: sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to norms, and general preferences for inaction (Gawronski et al., 2017; Körner et al., 2020). However, research has not yet determined whether motivational differences contribute to these three parameters in moral judgment. Across two studies, using regulatory mode theory, we demonstrate that a motivation to initiate and sustain smooth movement (locomotion), independent of a motive to engage in critical evaluation and reflection (assessment), is associated with greater sensitivity to norms in moral judgments. We demonstrate this association through both a chronic measure of individual differences (Study 1), and through a preregistered experimental induction (Study 2). Implications of our findings for moral judgment and motivation are discussed.